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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine a world in which the effects of a policy change could be 
tested in advance. Unintended consequences could be accounted for, 
mistakes corrected, and new proposals evaluated—all without the 
tremendous costs of a real-world trial. Experimental economics, pio-
neered by 2002 Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith, provides researchers 
with innovative techniques for determining the effects of policy 
changes ex ante. Through the use of mechanisms designed to capture 
the incentive structures of real-world environments, experimenters 
can reproduce and analyze decisionmaking contexts. In addition, 
benchmark comparisons can be made, and controlled replication be-
comes possible. Experiments cannot perfectly represent the real 
world, of course, but they allow researchers to test the “what ifs” of 
public policy at a fraction of the cost of real-world trials. As such, 
they provide a valuable tool for evaluating potential reforms.  
 This Article uses experimental economics to consider the effects of 
various tort reform proposals. Concerns about abuse of the American 
tort system have generated many calls for reform in recent years, as 
                                                                                                                      
 * The Center for the Study of Neuroeconomics, the Interdisciplinary Center for 
Economic Science, and the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 
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tort costs have rapidly escalated.1 A recent Tillinghast–Towers 
Perrin study placed the total costs of tort litigation at $233 billion in 
2002, more than two percent of U.S. GDP.2 This represents a 13.3% 
increase from the previous year alone.3 Litigation costs have been 
growing at an average rate of 9.8% per year since 1951.4 Only 46% of 
this total cost goes to victims in the form of economic and non-
economic damages.5 The Congressional Budget Office conjectures 
that “even leaving aside the largely unknown indirect costs, the cur-
rent tort system seems to be an inefficient way to compensate vic-
tims.”6  
 Legal scholars debate whether these large numbers truly indicate 
inefficiency,7 but it seems difficult to resolve this question with field 
data. Much relevant information, such as pretrial settlement offers 
and details of those cases that do not advance to trial, is generally 
unavailable to researchers. By allowing estimation of these and other 
variables that are inherently difficult to measure in the field, ex-
perimental economics provides an important complement to field re-
search.  
 Through an experimental study involving 128 subjects, we com-
pare pretrial settlement rates under a two-way cost-shifting rule 
with those under a baseline rule of no cost-shifting.8 We also examine 
the impact of court costs and discovery on settlement rates and the 
efficient use of the courts. We find no difference in settlement rates 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, TORT REFORM RECORD (2005), 
http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7927_Record7-05.pdf; Maria Newman, Bush Pushes Legisla-
tion to Limit ‘Frivolous Lawsuits,’ NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 15, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/12/15/politics/15cnd-bush.html?ex=1137387600&en=138068e8b1476197&ei=5070. 
 2. TILLINGHAST–TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 1 (2003), 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2003_Tort_Costs_Update/Tor
t_Costs_Trends_2003_Update.pdf.  
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. Id. at 1.  
 5. Id. at 17. 
 6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 21 
(2003).  
 7. According to the law-and-economics literature, it is efficient to use the court sys-
tem only when the costs of using that system are less than the cost of using private meth-
ods of resource allocation. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567 
(6th ed. 2003). 
 8. For purposes of this study, the term “cost” may be defined as “[t]he expenses of 
litigation, prosecution, or other legal transaction, esp. those allowed in favor of one party 
against the other.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 371 (8th ed. 2004). “Costs” shall not include 
attorneys’ fees. 
 “Cost-shifting” refers to the practice of assigning the prevailing party’s litigation costs 
to the losing party. “Two-way cost-shifting” describes a situation in which either party 
might become responsible for the other’s expenses, depending on the court’s decision. “One-
way cost-shifting,” discussed infra Part II.A, describes a situation in which only one party 
faces this risk of having to pay the other’s expenses if the court decides against him. The 
“baseline condition” in this study describes a situation of no cost-shifting, in which both 
parties are strictly responsible for their own expenses, regardless of the court’s decision.   
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between cost allocation rules; however, the increased court costs sig-
nificantly improve pretrial settlement rates. Liberal discovery rules, 
which promote the availability of full information, also improve set-
tlement rates under specific conditions, though they can impede set-
tlement in other situations. These results shed light on previous 
theoretical work and suggest avenues for further research. 
II.   LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.    Cost-Shifting 
Cost-shifting regimes come in two varieties: one-way and two-
way. Both are intended to promote efficiency by encouraging settle-
ments and keeping inefficient cases out of court. However, previous 
research indicates that one-way cost-shifting rules are less effective 
in promoting efficiency than two-way rules because of their asym-
metrical impact. This study examines the settlement-inducing poten-
tial of two-way cost-shifting rules.  
 Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an exam-
ple of one-way cost-shifting. Rule 68 allows the defendant in a tort 
action to send the plaintiff a special settlement offer known as an of-
fer of judgment. If the plaintiff rejects this offer but fails to obtain a 
more favorable award, he or she must pay the defendant’s legal costs 
from the time the offer was submitted.9 The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that this rule was designed to “encourage settlement and 
avoid litigation,” as it “prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the 
risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likeli-
hood of success upon trial on the merits.”10 Nonetheless, the current 
implementation of Rule 68 is fundamentally asymmetrical: only the 
                                                                                                                      
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. The text of the entire rule reads:  
 At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending 
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to 
be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the ser-
vice of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is ac-
cepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together 
with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An 
offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not ad-
missible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally ob-
tained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay 
the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made 
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one 
party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the 
amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceed-
ings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall 
have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a rea-
sonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to 
determine the amount or extent of liability. 
 Id. 
 10. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).  
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defendant has the option of serving an offer of judgment. Scholars 
have suggested that Rule 68 would promote settlements more effec-
tively if it were symmetrical, that is, if both sides could be penalized 
for rejecting favorable offers.11  
 Section 998 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides an 
example of two-way cost-shifting. Section 998 allows either party to 
submit an offer of judgment. If one party rejects the offer but fails to 
obtain a more favorable award from the court, he or she must pay the 
legal costs of the party that made the offer.12 The California Supreme 
Court has explained that the purpose of section 998 is “to encourage 
both the making and the acceptance of reasonable settlement of-
fers.”13 
 There is a significant amount of theoretical research on cost-
shifting but relatively little empirical research. In one of the few em-
pirical studies, Coursey and Stanley used a set of experiments to 
simulate the process of bargaining under the threat of trial.14 Their 
experiments were designed to simulate three cost-allocation rules: 
the American Rule (both parties bear their own legal costs), Federal 
Rule 68 and California Section 998 (party who rejects a pretrial offer 
must pay costs if award is less favorable than the pretrial offer), and 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Proposed Court Rules, 102 F.R.D. 407, 423-24 (1984) (recommending Rule 68 
should be modified so that all parties, including claimants, be allowed to make offers of 
settlement under Rule 68);  Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 93, 123-25 (1986) (arguing that a mutual offer of judgment cost-shifting rule 
(which includes attorneys’ fees as costs) would provide greater benefits at less cost than 
the current Rule 68). 
 12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 2002).  Section 998 reads in relevant part: 
Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial or arbitration . . . any 
party may serve an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow 
judgment to be taken or an award to be entered in accordance with the terms 
and conditions stated at that time. 
  . . . . 
  . . . If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to ob-
tain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or 
her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the of-
fer. 
  . . . . 
  . . . If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant fails to ob-
tain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding other 
than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may 
require the defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of 
expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually in-
curred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or ar-
bitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the plaintiff, in addition 
to plaintiff’s costs. 
Id. § 998(b), (c)(1), (d). 
 13. Scott Co. of Cal. v. Blount, Inc., 979 P.2d 974 (Cal. 1999). 
 14. Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the 
Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 162 
(1988).  
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the English Rule (loser pays the legal costs).15 They found that sub-
jects settled most frequently under Federal Rule 68, second most un-
der the English Rule, and least of all under the American Rule of cost 
allocation.16 Coursey and Stanley also reported, however, that Rule 
68 redistributes wealth from plaintiffs to defendants by creating in-
centives for plaintiffs to accept lower settlement offers than they oth-
erwise would have.17 They suggested that adoption of a symmetric 
cost-shifting rule, such as section 998, California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, might promote settlements while curbing Rule 68’s redistribu-
tive tendencies, but they did not test such a rule.18  
 Anderson and Rowe also conducted empirical research on rules 
meant to promote settlement.19 They created an experiment that 
used computers to present participants (law students and attorneys) 
with a theoretical tort case.20 The computer provided information 
about claims and verdicts in similar cases and then asked the par-
ticipants to give estimates of the percentage likelihood of verdicts 
above several levels and a single best estimate of a likely jury 
award.21 Anderson and Rowe concluded that a modified version of 
Rule 68, which would include two-way attorney fee-shifting, in-
creases the likelihood of settlement because the attorney fee-shifting 
increased the maximum amount a defendant would be willing to pay 
to settle and decreased the amount a plaintiff would be willing to ac-
cept to settle. 22  
 A third empirical study was conducted by the Federal Judicial 
Center.23 To assist the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States in considering possible amend-
ments to Rule 68, the Federal Judicial Center sent surveys to a ran-
dom sample of 1951 attorneys who had been involved in cases in the 
federal courts.24 The survey asked the attorneys the following ques-
tions: What were the costs of the litigation in which they were in-
volved? What proportion of cases that went to trial could have set-
                                                                                                                      
 15. Id. at 161.  
 16. Id. at 170. Coursey and Stanley do not distinguish between attorneys’ fees and 
other litigation costs for purposes of their study. Id. at 177 n.6. They define “costs” to in-
clude attorneys’ fees, despite the fact that, in the real world, attorneys’ fees are generally 
not considered to be recoverable costs under Rule 68. Id. Coursey and Stanley indicate 
that, if they did distinguish between attorneys’ fees and other costs, the English Rule 
might produce higher settlement rates than Rule 68. Id.   
 17. Id. at 176. 
 18. Id. 
 19. David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical Evidence on Settlement De-
vices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519 (1995).  
 20. Id. at 525-26.  
 21. Id. at 527.  
 22. Id. at 541-42.  
 23. JOHN E. SHAPARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMENDMENTS 
TO RULE 68, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995).   
 24. Id. at 3.   
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tled? What proportion of settled cases could have settled earlier? 
What proportion of litigation expenses might have been saved 
whether or not cases settled? Whether an offer-of-judgment rule hurt 
the risk-averse litigant? What were the attorneys’ views about offer-
of-judgment rules?25 The author concluded:  
 In spite of the dominance of opinion supporting an amendment 
to strengthen Rule 68 by allowing any party to make an offer of 
judgment and allowing the offeror to recover at least some portion 
of its post-offer attorneys’ fees, it is important to recognize that at-
torneys have strong opinions on both sides of the issue. The major-
ity believe strongly that a strengthened Rule 68 would enhance ac-
cess to the courts, increase fairness, and reduce litigation expenses 
and delay. A minority believe just as strongly, however, that such 
a rule would penalize those seeking access to the courts; produce 
unfair results; and increase the costs, delay, and complexity of liti-
gation. 
 The objective results, however, suggest that a strengthened Rule 
68 may produce more fairness and achieve a sizable reduction in 
litigation expenses that are unnecessary, abusive, or at least 
avoidable by encouraging settlement of cases instead of trial or by 
encouraging earlier settlements. Such a rule could also expedite 
disposition for settled cases that could have settled earlier and for 
tried cases that could reasonably settle rather than go to trial. A 
strengthened Rule 68 that precludes an award of expenses in ex-
cess of the amount of a plaintiff’s judgment would most likely in-
crease the incidence of risk aversion only slightly while encourag-
ing litigation of small but strong claims and discouraging pursuit 
of weak but high-stakes cases.26 
 This Article tests the recommendations of those who advocate a 
two-way cost-shifting rule by examining the settlement-inducing po-
tential of such a rule. We compare settlement rates and efficiency 
levels obtained under section 998 with those obtained under a base-
line condition, in which no cost-shifting occurs. 
B.   Court Costs 
 The word “costs” as used in Rule 68 and Section 998 is a term of 
art and only refers to the shifting of certain costs. In Marek v. 
Chesny, the Supreme Court found that “the term ‘costs’ in Rule 68 
was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the rele-
vant substantive statute or other authority. In other words, all costs 
properly awardable in an action are to be considered within the scope 
of Rule 68 costs.”27 Generally, this means that recoverable costs are 
                                                                                                                      
 25. Id. at 5-6.  
 26. Id. at 3.  
 27. 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).  
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limited to things like filing fees,28 copying fees,29 and the costs for 
witnesses.30 In most instances, attorneys’ fees, by far the most sig-
nificant trial expenditure, are not recoverable under Rule 68.31 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has stated that “where the underlying stat-
ute defines ‘costs’ to include attorney’s fees, we are satisfied such fees 
are to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68.”32  
 Section 998 does not expressly provide for the recovery of attor-
neys’ fees. However, the California Code of Civil Procedure states 
elsewhere that attorneys’ fees are to be included as recoverable costs 
when provided by statute or contract. Otherwise, the matter may be 
left to the discretion of the court.33  
 In this Article we examine two different cost environments, one in 
which court costs are low relative to suit value and the other in 
which they are high. The study is agnostic as to the means by which 
the court costs are varied. In practice, this could be accomplished by 
changing filing fees or court recorder fees. Another method of varying 
court costs would be to change the definition of “costs” to include at-
torneys’ fees. In such a case, a party who must pay his or her oppo-
nent’s costs under Rule 68 or section 998 would now be responsible 
for the opponent’s attorneys’ fees as well. This last method of increas-
ing court costs bears particular significance because scholars dis-
agree about whether including attorneys’ fees as costs would increase 
the likelihood of settlement.34 Avery Wiener Katz explains:  
                                                                                                                      
 28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920(1), 1923 (2000); see also Gorelangton v. City of Reno, 638 F. 
Supp. 1426, 1433 (D. Nev. 1986) (allowing the recovery of filing fees); Raio v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 608, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that recoverable costs include the 
filing fee). 
 29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2000); see also Radol v. Thomas, 113 F.R.D. 172, 175 (S.D. 
Ohio 1986) (allowing recovery for the costs of copying for documents which were used and 
admitted into evidence as well as for the cost of jury books); Gorelangton, 638 F. Supp. at 
1434 (permitting the recovery of some photocopying costs).  
 30. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821(b), 1920(3) (2000); see also Quy v. Air America, Inc., 667 
F.2d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that witness costs are taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 
1821 even if the witness is not used at trial as long as the witness was called on counsel’s 
good faith and reasonable judgment); Roberts v. S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos, 651 F.2d 201, 
203 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that travel costs of witnesses are recoverable when witnesses 
appear pursuant to a court order, even if the travel is from a foreign nation).  
 31. See, e.g., Agola v. Hagner, 678 F. Supp. 988, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Avery Wiener 
Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 63, 78 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest 
eds., 2000). 
 32. Marek , 473 U.S. at 9. 
 33. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1021-1038 (West 2005).  
 34. Some scholars argue that fee-shifting (including attorneys’ fees as recoverable 
costs) increases the likelihood of settlement. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Juris-
prudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorney’s Fees by Amending Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REV. 65, 65-69 (1996). Others argue that fee-shifting de-
creases the likelihood of settlement. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A 
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Anna Aven Sumner, Note, Is the Gummy Rule of Today Truly Bet-
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[T]he current state of economic knowledge does not enable us re-
liably to predict whether a move to fuller indemnification would 
raise or lower the total costs of litigation, let alone whether it 
would better align those costs with any social benefits they might 
generate. 
 The reason for this agnostic conclusion is straightforward. Legal 
costs influence all aspects of the litigation process, from the deci-
sion to file suit to the choice between settlement and trial to the 
question whether to take precautions against a dispute in the first 
place . . . . The combination of all these external effects are too 
complicated to be remedied by a simple rule of “loser pays.” In-
stead, indemnity of legal fees remedies some externalities while 
failing to address and even exacerbating others.35 
It should be emphasized, however, that this study only examines the 
effects of increased court fees, not the means by which the court fees 
are increased.  
C.   Discovery 
 In this Article we also look at the impact of discovery on settle-
ment rates and efficiency. We interpret the federal rules that relate 
to discovery as affecting the information available to the parties.36 In 
our experiment, this is captured by comparing behavior under sym-
metric and asymmetric information. We examine how pretrial nego-
tiations and settlements are affected by these informational differ-
ences.  
 Some scholars have argued that surprise in litigation is a good 
thing and an integral part of the adversarial legal system.37 Others, 
such as Justice Murphy, have argued that “[m]utual knowledge of all 
the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper liti-
gation.”38 Edson Sunderland, the drafter of what became Rules 26 to 
37,39 wrote: 
 It is probable that no procedural process offers greater opportu-
nities for increasing the efficiency of the administration of justice 
than that of discovery before trial. Much of the delay in the prepa-
ration of a case, most of the lost effort in the course of the trial, 
                                                                                                                      
ter Than the Toothy Rule of Tomorrow? How Federal Rule 68 Should Be Modified, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 1055 (2003).  
 35. Katz, supra note 31, at 64-65. 
 36. That is, we do not examine any one rule specifically, such as Rule 26.  Rather we 
view the discovery process broadly as a means of increasing the information available to 
both parties.   
 37. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: What’s So Wrong About 
Surprise?, 39 A.B.A. J. 1075 (1953).  
 38. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).  
 39. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of 
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698 (1998).  
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and a large part of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from the 
want of information on the part of litigants and their counsel as to 
the real nature of the respective claims and the facts upon which 
they rest.40 
Another legal scholar has explained that discovery’s proponents be-
lieved that discovery would lead to a more efficient administration of 
justice:  
 Besides converting trials and pretrial negotiations into more so-
ber and more orderly searches for the truth, discovery was ex-
pected to reduce the number of trials and thus relieve the burden 
on the courts. If the full truth would soon be revealed, fewer sham 
suits would be filed. If the adversaries and the court knew the 
facts before trial, the court could render more summary judg-
ments. If both sides knew the full truth and each other’s strengths 
and weaknesses, they would settle the case and avoid the costs and 
uncertainties of trial. If both sides knew all the facts, lawyers and 
clients would be more satisfied with the settlement terms and 
would carry out the agreement willingly.41 
In essence, with discovery, “[e]ach party may in effect be called upon 
by his adversary or by the judge to lay all his cards upon the table, 
the important consideration being who has the stronger hand, not 
who can play the cleverer game.”42 
 Some researchers have studied the effect of informational symme-
try on settlement rates. For example, Linda Babcock and Claudia 
Landeo studied pretrial bargaining in a state of asymmetric informa-
tion.43 Their study also examined the effect of a newly proposed liti-
gation institution called a settlement escrow.44 Babcock and Landeo 
examined subjects’ behavior as they bargained with and without cer-
tainty,45 and with and without escrow.46 They found that escrow only 
affected settlements when bargaining was conducted under uncer-
                                                                                                                      
 40. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE 
TRIAL, at iii (1932). 
 41. WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 11-12 
(1968). 
 42. Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 
TENN. L. REV. 737, 739 (1939).  
 43. Linda Babcock & Claudia M. Landeo, Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study 
of a Bilateral Bargaining Game, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 401 (2004).  
  44. They describe a settlement escrow as a new litigation institution whereby:  
[A] neutral agent receives settlement offers from both parties in a lawsuit. If 
the defendant offers more than the plaintiff demands, the court imposes a set-
tlement at the midpoint of the offers. If the offers do not overlap in this way, 
the offers remain secret and litigants proceed to pre-trial bargaining. 
Id. at 402.   
 45. Babcock and Landeo defined certainty as “where the plaintiff and defendant know 
the true level of damages, and uncertainty, where the plaintiff knows the damage level but 
the defendant is uncertain about the damages caused to the plaintiff.” Id. at 406.  
 46. Id. at 406.  
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tainty.47 They also found that “when uncertainty was present . . . set-
tlement rates were positively and significantly influenced by the es-
crow bargaining institution.”48 And lastly, they found that settlement 
rates are negatively, but not significantly, influenced by uncer-
tainty.49 
 This Article considers the effects of full and partial information on 
settlement rates and efficiency. 
III.   EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 This study modeled a lawsuit as a bargaining game between sub-
jects interacting anonymously in the roles of plaintiff and defendant. 
The plaintiff initiated the suit by sending a compensation request to 
the defendant. The parties were then given a fixed period of time in 
which to negotiate a settlement. If they failed to reach an agreement 
within that time, the court imposed a decision and both parties were 
required to pay court costs. 
A.   The Economic Environment 
 Information about the potential court decision was communicated 
to the parties at the beginning of the settlement negotiations. This 
information was conveyed by the following equation: 
Min = Max × C. 
The parties were informed that if they failed to agree on a settle-
ment, the court would impose a decision between Min and Max. All 
values in this range were equally likely. 
 Max, the upper boundary for a court decision, was an 
equiprobable random number between 0 and 1000.50 The average, or 
expected value, of Max is therefore 500. Min, the lower boundary for 
a court decision, was calculated by multiplying Max and C, a random 
number between 0 and 1 that represented the strength of the plain-
tiff’s claim. The expected values for C and Min are 0.5 and 250, re-
spectively. 
 This study considered the results of sixteen experiments. A single 
experiment consisted of twenty-four suits. These suits were divided 
into six periods of four suits each. The value for Max stayed constant 
for all suits within one period. However, the value for C (and there-
fore Min) changed with every suit.   
                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. at 410. 
 48. Id. at 409.  
 49. Id. at 410.  
 50. All lawsuits in this experiment were negotiated in U.S. cents.  Thus, values of Min 
and Max, settlement offers, and court costs were expressed in cents. So if Min = 300 and 
Max = 600, the court would award damages between $3.00 and $6.00. 
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 Figure 1 shows the sequence of Min and Max values used in each 
experimental session. For example, in the first suit of Period 1, the 
maximum possible court decision was 431, while the minimum deci-
sion was 43.1. In the second suit of Period 1, the maximum court de-
cision was still 431, but the C had changed, resulting in a minimum 
decision of 172.4. Not until the next period did the maximum decision 
change. 
FIGURE 1 
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
Each experiment involved eight subjects, divided into four plaintiff-
defendant pairs. Each pair experienced the same set of twenty-four 
suits, giving us a total of ninety-six suits in each of our sixteen ex-
periments. 
B.   The Legal Process 
 At the beginning of each suit, the plaintiff and defendant were 
each given information about some or all of Min, Max, and C, to en-
able them to form their bargaining strategies in light of the potential 
court outcome.    
 The plaintiff initiated the suit by paying a fee and submitting a 
compensation request to the defendant. The plaintiff was required to 
initiate every suit. The parties then entered the negotiation period, 
which is depicted in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 
 
Bargaining continued until a predetermined amount of time had 
elapsed. If no settlement had been reached within this time, the par-
ties were required to pay an additional fee to have the court settle 
the dispute. The court was modeled as a random decision between 
Min and Max. Parties were informed that all values over this range 
were equally likely. On the other hand, if either party accepted the 
current opposing offer before the time ran out, then the suit settled 
out of court, and neither side had to pay any court fees.  
C.   Experimental Treatments 
 This study consists of three treatments arranged in a 2 × 2 × 2 de-
sign (see Table 1). The primary goals of this design were (1) to test 
the effectiveness of a two-way cost-shifting rule, such as section 998, 
in promoting efficient out-of-court settlements, (2) to examine the ef-
fect of court costs on settlement decisions and efficiency, and (3) to 
test the effects of information asymmetries produced by disclosure 
rules. 
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 The first treatment studied cost-shifting by comparing section 998 
to a simple baseline condition of no cost-shifting. In the case of sec-
tion 998, any party who turned down a settlement offer that would 
have been better for him than the court’s ultimate decision must pay 
the legal costs of both sides. In the case of the baseline condition, 
each party is strictly responsible for his own expenses. Eight experi-
ments were conducted using section 998 and eight using the baseline 
condition.  
 A second treatment studied the effects of changing the informa-
tion available to the parties. For half of each experiment (three peri-
ods), information given to the parties was both symmetric and com-
plete. Both the plaintiff’s attorney and the defense attorney knew the 
upper and lower boundary for every court decision as well as the 
merits of the claim. For the other half of each experiment, however, 
information was incomplete and asymmetric. In this treatment, the 
defendant only knew the upper bound of the court decision (Max), 
while the plaintiff only knew merits of the claim (C). Neither party 
knew the lower bound (Min). In eight of the experiments, symmetric 
information was presented first; while in the other eight, asymmetric 
information was presented first. 
 The third treatment varied the cost of taking a case to trial. 
Within each cost-shifting condition, four experiments had 50-cent 
court fees, and four experiments had 150-cent court fees. In the case 
of section 998, this translates to increasing the penalty for rejecting 
favorable settlement offers. (An offer is deemed favorable if it is bet-
ter for the party in question than the court-awarded decision.) Thus, 
under the low-fee version of section 998, rejection of a favorable offer 
resulted in a penalty of 100 cents; under the high-fee condition, how-
ever, this penalty increased to 300 cents. The high-fee condition cap-
tures the inclusion of attorneys’ fees as recoverable costs under sec-
tion 998.51  
 The treatment matrix (Table 1) is also divided according to the 
values of Max and C. For half of each experiment (3 periods), poten-
tial court awards were large (Max ≥ 500); in the other three periods, 
Max was below 500. Similarly, in each experiment, half of the suits 
had high merit (C ≥ 0.5), while the other half had low merit. There 
are a total of forty-eight suits in every cell of Table 1. 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See, e.g., SHAPARD, supra note 23; Miller, supra note 11. 
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TREATMENT MATRIX–48 SUITS IN EACH BLOCK 
 
   
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, cell 4 contains 48 suits that were negotiated under sec-
tion 998, with high court costs and symmetric information. Addition-
ally, the suits in cell 4 had Max values greater than 500 and C values 
greater that 0.5. Similarly, cell 31 contains 48 suits that were negoti-
ated under the baseline condition, with low court costs and asymmet-
ric information. Furthermore, the suits in cell 31 had Max values be-
low 500 and C values greater than 0.5. 
D.   Experimental Procedures 
 The subjects for this study were primarily undergraduate stu-
dents at George Mason University, recruited by e-mail or by flyers 
distributed on campus. Most had participated in previous behavioral 
experiments, but all were new to this particular design. They were 
paid for arriving on time and received earnings based on their per-
formance in the experiment. 
 The experiments were conducted in the laboratories of the Inter-
disciplinary Center for Economic Science and the Center for the 
2005]              EFFICIENT SETTLEMENT OF TORT CLAIMS 103 
 
Study of Neuroeconomics at George Mason University. The laborato-
ries contained computer terminals for the subjects, separated by par-
titions to ensure individual privacy. Talking between participants 
was not allowed. 
 Upon entering the laboratory, each subject was randomly as-
signed the role of plaintiff or defendant. He or she continued in this 
role for the duration of the experiment. The subjects were seated at 
networked computer terminals and told to read through a set of 
online instructions. Any questions were answered in the hearing of 
the whole group before the start of the experiment. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, each plaintiff was randomly 
and anonymously matched with a defendant via the computer net-
work. They negotiated together for one period (4 rounds). At the be-
ginning of the next period, all plaintiffs were randomly matched with 
new defendants. Every experiment involved eight subjects, or four 
negotiation pairs. 
 The screen seen by a typical plaintiff is shown in Figure 3. In this 
example, the case had a C value of 0.80, indicating strong merit, al-
though the upper bound of the court decision was only 100. 
FIGURE 3 
A TYPICAL PLAINTIFF’S NEGOTIATION SCREEN 
 
 To guard against cultural preconceptions, the subjects were not 
told the legal nature of the experiment. Instead of “defendant” or 
“plaintiff,” roles were given as “Player D” or “Player T.” Other legal 
terminology was also excluded: suits were referred to as “rounds,” 
and the court was introduced as the “computer.”52  
 The following incentives were provided to the subjects. At the be-
ginning each defendant received a budget for each period, from which 
                                                                                                                      
 52. It is common practice in behavioral experiments not to reveal the real-world con-
text of the experiments to subjects. Explaining the real-world context can introduce cul-
tural preconceptions and make subjects feel pressured to behave in some “right” way. See, 
e.g., Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodo-
logical Challenge for Psychologists?, BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 383, 386, 402 n.4 (2001). 
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to finance the suits brought against him. He was allowed to keep 
whatever remained of the budget at the end of the experiment. Plain-
tiffs received half of every settlement obtained for their clients minus 
all court expenses.53  
 To reduce the risk of bankruptcy during the experiment, each de-
fendant began the experiment with 2000 cents and received a fresh 
budget of 1500 cents at the start of every period. After all lawsuits 
and court fees had been subtracted, the defendant kept the remain-
ing sum as his earnings for the experiment. Each plaintiff began the 
experiment with 1000 cents. The plaintiff did not receive further en-
dowments but kept half of every settlement or decision, minus the 
initiation fees and any court fees, as his earnings. Every subject 
could see his accumulated earnings throughout the experiment. (See 
the box labeled “Cash” in Figure 3). 
 As shown in Figure 3, the latest offers were displayed in boxes la-
beled “Your Offer” and “Counterparts Offer.” To accept an offer, a 
subject simply repeated his counterpart’s offer as his offer. The par-
ties were given two minutes in which to bargain. If they reached an 
agreement within the allotted time, the defendant paid the negoti-
ated amount from his budget, and the plaintiff kept half of this as his 
settlement. If they did not agree, the computer, acting as the court, 
imposed a random decision between Min and Max, and both parties 
had to pay court fees.  
IV.   RESULTS 
A.   Measurement 
 In each experiment, we recorded the series of offers made by each 
party and whether a settlement was reached. In this Article, we con-
sider the following data: (1) values for Min and Max; (2) the settle-
ment amount, if applicable; and (3) the court decision, otherwise. 
Figure 4 shows this data for all four pairs of subjects during the first 
two periods of one experiment. Solid circles indicate a settlement, 
while solid squares indicate a court decision.  
  
                                                                                                                      
 53. While the agency relationship between client and attorney suggests an interesting 
avenue for research, we elected not to focus on it in this study. We combined the roles of 
client and attorney by regarding each subject as the representer of a plaintiff or defense 
team. In every suit, subjects were incentivized to maximize the total return to their claim, 
without regard to the division of that return between client and attorney. This allows us to 
minimize the principal/agent problem and to focus on the adversarial nature of the tort 
system. 
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FIGURE 4 
DATA SAMPLE (2 PERIODS) 
 
B.   Data Analysis 
1.   Settlements 
 First we consider the effects of our treatments on subjects’ ten-
dency to reach a settlement before trial. Settlement rates for each 
condition are reported in Table 2. The shaded numbers in every cell 
correspond to the cell numbers in Table 1. 
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TABLE 2 
SETTLEMENT RATES 
 SYMMETRIC  ASYMMETRIC 
 
BASE-
LINE § 998 
BASE-
LINE § 998  
BASE-
LINE § 998 
BASE-
LINE § 998 
  1 2   3  4   17 18 19 20 
High 85.42 89.58 77.08 85.42  83.33 83.33 81.25 83.33 
Costs                  
 21.95 34.88 13.51 12.20  45.00 37.50 15.38 17.50 
  5 6   7 8   21  22 23 24 
Low 60.42 58.33 56.25 64.58  79.17 60.42 60.42 58.33 
Costs                  
 17.24 35.71 14.81 35.48  15.79 48.28 10.34 25.00 
  9 10 11 12  25  26 27 28 
High 81.25 77.08 91.67 87.50  66.67 75.00 50.00 45.83 
Costs                  
 48.72 56.76 43.18 50.00  75.00 77.78 41.67 68.18 
 13  14 15 16   29  30 31 32 
Low 62.50 66.67 83.33 75.00  47.92 43.75 33.33 29.17 
Costs                  
 36.67 59.38 32.50 38.89  69.57 76.19 25.00 50.00 
 
Note: The top entry in each cell of Table 2 gives the percentage of suits in that 
cell for which the subjects were able to reach a settlement. The bottom entry in 
each cell of Table 2 gives the percentage of settlements that favored plaintiff 
(settlement – midpoint > 0). Forty-eight suits are in each block. Shaded cell 
numbers correspond to those in Table 1.  
 A t-test54 was used to make a cell-by-cell comparison (N = 48) of 
settlement rates between the baseline condition and section 998. We 
find only the comparison of cells 21 (baseline) and 22 (section 998) 
shows a significant difference at the 0.05 level. This difference goes 
away when we compare 21 + 29 with 22 + 30. Thus, we are led to 
conclude that section 998 does not lead to significantly higher pre-
trial settlement rates than the baseline condition. 
 Next, a t-test was used to make a row-by-row comparison (N = 
192) of settlement rates between the High Court Costs and Low 
Court Costs treatments. We find a significant difference at below the 
                                                                                                                      
 54. A t-test is used to test the null hypothesis that two proportions are equal.  The 
test statistic that we use is given by: 
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where 1pˆ  and 2pˆ are the sample proportions and 1n and 2n are the sample sizes. For more 
information, see MORRIS H. DEGROOT & MARK J. SCHERUISH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS, 
ch. 8 (3d ed. 2002) and GEORGE E. P. BOX ET AL., STATISTICS FOR EXPERIMENTERS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO DESIGN, DATA ANALYSIS, AND MODEL BUILDING (1978). 
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0.01 level for all 4 comparisons. We are led to conclude that the in-
crease in court fees creates a strong incentive for early settlement. 
 Finally, a t-test was used to make a row-by-row comparison (N = 
192) of settlement rates between the symmetric and asymmetric in-
formation treatments. We find a significant difference at below the 
0.01 level for the Low Max cells in both the High and Low Fee treat-
ments. We find no significant differences in the High Max cells. We 
are led to conclude that the symmetry of information greatly in-
creases settlement rates, but only when the maximum potential 
court award (Max) is low. 
 The second entry in each cell of Table 2 indicates the percentage 
of settlements that were favorable to the plaintiff. A settlement is 
deemed favorable to the plaintiff if it is greater than the expected 
court award (the midpoint between Min and Max).55 We observe that 
plaintiffs often settled below the midpoint; although, in all but two of 
the comparisons, they did better under section 998 than under the 
baseline condition. We are led to conclude that section 998 improves 
outcomes for plaintiffs over the baseline condition of no cost-shifting.  
 Figure 5 examines how the settlement rates vary with the level of 
uncertainty about the potential court decision. As Min and Max move 
farther apart, the uncertainty level about the court’s decision in-
creases, since all values between Min and Max are equally likely. 
The columns in Figure 5 depict the uncertainty level (Max - Min) for 
each of the 24 suits. The suits have been sorted from least uncer-
tainty to greatest. The marker above each column indicates the 
number of settlements that occurred in that suit.56 The baseline con-
dition and section 998 treatments have been combined for this analy-
sis, since there are no significant differences in settlement rates be-
tween them. 
                                                                                                                      
 55. In this experiment, no performance measure exists for deciding whether a particu-
lar settlement is “fair” to the plaintiff, the defendant, or society as a whole. Instead we de-
termine how favorable or unfavorable the outcome is, in a more limited sense, by compar-
ing settlement outcome to expected court decisions. 
 56. The number of settlements has been multiplied by fifty for scaling purposes. 
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FIGURE 5 
SETTLEMENT RATES AND UNCERTAINTY IN COURT DECISIONS  
 
  
 The two graphs on the left side of Figure 5 depict cases negotiated 
under symmetric information—where both parties knew the values 
of Min and Max. In these graphs, we observe that subjects settled 
low-uncertainty cases more frequently than they did high-
uncertainty cases. The downward-sloping trend lines indicate that 
settlement rates declined as the difference between Min and Max in-
creased. This may be due to the fact that when the difference be-
tween Min and Max is small, both parties have a high degree of cer-
tainty about the court outcome. Rational negotiators will therefore 
settle to avoid the court costs. When Min and Max are far apart, 
however, the court’s decision is less certain. Parties may have diffi-
culty reaching settlement because they perceive one another as being 
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greedy in efforts to capture larger portions of the decision range. This 
downward trend of settlements is evident under both high and low 
court costs, though the effect is less pronounced when costs are high. 
This is because the high court costs generate strong incentives to set-
tle, regardless of the uncertainty about the potential court decision.   
 The graphs on the right side of Figure 5 depict cases negotiated 
under asymmetric information—where the defendant only knew Max 
and the plaintiff only knew C. Here we observe the opposite trend in 
settlement rates. Settlement rates actually increased as Min and 
Max move farther apart. We believe this is due to the fact that nei-
ther party knew the range of Min and Max. The best estimates that 
the parties could form, based on the information they received, led 
them to form very different expectations of the potential court deci-
sion. 
 When both parties know Min and Max, they expect the court deci-
sion to be the average of the boundary values as represented by 
Equation 1 where EC represents the expected court decision: 
EC = (Min + Max) / 2  (Equation 1). 
When the parties do not know Min and Max, however, they have to 
estimate the expected court decision using the information they are 
given. For example, the defendant knows Max but not Min. He also 
knows that C is a random number between 0 and 1, with an expected 
value of 0.5. Therefore, he can estimate Min = Max × 0.5. We can 
substitute this estimate of Min into Equation 1 to obtain the defen-
dant’s best estimate of the likely court outcome (DEC):  
DEC = (0.5 × Max + Max) / 2 = 0.75 × Max (Equation 2). 
The plaintiff knows the value of C. She also knows that Max is a 
random number between 0 and 1000 with an expected value of 500. 
She estimates Max = 500 and Min = C × 500. We substitute these es-
timates of Max and Min into Equation 1 to obtain the plaintiff’s best 
estimate of the court’s decision (PEC): 
PEC = (C × 500 + 500) / 2 = 250(C + 1) (Equation 3). 
In our study, the suits where Min and Max are close together tend to 
be those cases where Max is low (see Figure 1). The defendant, who 
sees the true value of Max, forms a fairly accurate estimate of the 
court decision. He therefore sends the plaintiff low settlement offers. 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, estimates Max to be 500, and there-
fore forms a much higher estimate of the court decision. She will not 
accept the defendant’s low settlement offers because she expects the 
court to give her a higher award. This is why, under asymmetric in-
formation, we observe low settlement rates when Min and Max are 
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close together. Where Min and Max are far apart, however, Max 
tends to be large (see Figure 1), and the defendant’s expected court 
outcome is more likely to be greater than the plaintiff’s. This creates 
a range of values over which settlement is possible. Furthermore, 
perceptions of greed will be less likely to impede settlement under 
asymmetric information, because neither party knows the true size of 
the decision range. Thus, differences in expectations can account for 
the increase in settlement rates observed under asymmetric informa-
tion as Min and Max diverge. 
 The primary conclusions that we can draw from Figure 5 are that 
(1) differences in parties’ expectations caused by asymmetric infor-
mation can impede settlement, especially if the plaintiff’s expected 
court outcome exceeds the defendant’s; (2) asymmetric information 
can promote settlement in other cases by reducing perceptions of 
greed between negotiators; and (3) high court costs produce more set-
tlements than low court costs, regardless of differences in expecta-
tions between negotiators. 
 In Figure 6, we continue to examine the effects on settlement 
rates of differences in expectations produced by asymmetric informa-
tion. Using Equations 2 and 3, we can measure the uncertainty (U) 
caused by divergent expectations as the unsigned difference between 
defendant and plaintiff’s expected court awards as follows: 
U = | DEC – PEC |. 
Informational asymmetries can lead parties to be overly optimistic in 
their estimates of the court decision, leading them to reject reason-
able settlement offers and proceed to trial. Figure 6 shows how set-
tlements rates are affected by differences in expectations (U). Notice 
that settlement rates tend to decline as U increases, and for U > 125, 
the variation in number of settlements increases dramatically.   
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FIGURE 6 
DIFFERENCES IN EXPECTATIONS AFFECT SETTLEMENT RATES 
 
 Finally, we examine overall settlement rates across experiments. 
Figure 7 shows the number of subjects who settled a given number of 
their 24 suits. For example, 27 subjects settled either 17 or 18 of 
their suits. The number of settlements appears to be negative bino-
mially distributed with a mode of 18 and a mean of 16.25. This indi-
cates that most of the subjects settled most of their disputes out of 
court, as happens in the real world. 
FIGURE 7 
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2.   Efficiency 
 Now we turn to examine the effects of our three treatment vari-
ables (cost-shifting, information, and court fees) on the efficient use 
of the courts. We will consider two measures of efficiency: ex ante ef-
ficiency, which examines whether a particular type of suit should 
ever go court; and ex post efficiency, which considers whether indi-
vidual negotiators minimized costs in their decisions to proceed to 
trial. 
 Several lawsuits in each experiment were inefficient by virtue of 
the experimental environment. A lawsuit is considered to be ex ante 
inefficient if Max – Min ≤ 2 × Court Cost. These are cases that should 
never go to court because any possible settlement between Min and 
Max would be better for both parties than going to court and having 
to pay court fees.57 Figure 8 shows the number of ex ante inefficient 
cases in each treatment, as well as the number of these that actually 
went to court. Only suits negotiated under symmetric information 
are considered, because identifying a suit as ex ante inefficient re-
quires knowledge of both Min and Max, in addition to the court costs.   
                                                                                                                      
 57. For example, suppose that Min = 400, Max = 430, and the cost to each party of go-
ing to court is 50. If the parties settle for any amount between Min and Max, the plaintiff 
will receive a return ranging from $200 to $215 and the defendant will incur losses ranging 
from $400 to $430. If they go to court, however, the plaintiff will only receive a return 
ranging from $150 to $165 and the defendant will incur losses ranging from $450 to $480.  
Cost-minimizing subjects would never go to court under such conditions. To do so would be 
wasteful and inefficient. This type of inefficiency is called ex ante because it can be identi-
fied before negotiations begin, just from the values of Min, Max, and Court Cost. 
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FIGURE 8 
EX ANTE INEFFICIENCY (SYMMETRIC INFORMATION ONLY) 
  
  
Notice that by this measure, inefficiency was quite low. Furthermore, 
high court costs tended to decrease the percentage of inefficient cases 
that went to court.  
 We now turn to a stricter definition of efficiency. A suit is consid-
ered to be ex post inefficient if either party failed to cost-minimize in 
his or her decision to go to court. A defendant failed to cost-minimize 
if the last offer received from the plaintiff was less than the expected 
court outcome plus the court cost: 
Last Offer Received < (Min + Max)/2 + Court Cost. 
 A plaintiff failed to cost-minimize if the last offer received from 
the defendant was greater than the expected court decision minus 
the court fee: 
Last Offer Received > (1/2(Min + Max)/2) – Court Cost. 
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Clearly, if either of these conditions holds, at least one party would 
have been better off accepting his counterpart’s offer instead of going 
to court.58 Since these calculations can only be made at the conclusion 
of the bargaining process when the last offers are known, we refer to 
this form of inefficiency as ex post inefficiency. Figure 9 compares the 
number of ex post inefficiencies in each treatment with the total 
number of court cases. 
FIGURE 9 
EX POST INEFFICIENCY (SYMMETRIC INFORMATION ONLY) 
  
  
                                                                                                                      
 58. For example, suppose Min = 300, Max = 600, and the cost to each party of going to 
court is 50. The expected court decision in this case is $450. Suppose the plaintiff receives a 
settlement offer of $410 but rejects it and proceeds to court. The plaintiff has failed to cost-
minimize because her expected return from going to court ($400 = $450 – $50) is less than 
her return from accepting the settlement offer ($410).  If the defendant rejects a settlement 
offer of $470, he has also failed to cost-minimize, because his expected losses from going to 
court ($500 = $450 + $50) are greater than his losses from accepting the settlement offer 
($470). 
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Notice that ex post inefficiencies are much more likely to occur than 
ex ante inefficiencies. This can be seen from the fact that most of the 
total court cases (88.9%) exhibit some form of ex post inefficiency, 
while comparatively fewer (38.4%) exhibit ex ante inefficiency. Notice 
also that high court costs tend to exacerbate ex post inefficiency. This 
can be seen from the fact that 98.3% of the total court cases were ex 
post inefficient under the high court costs treatment, compared to 
84.7% of the total under low court costs.  
3.   Penalties Under Section 998 
 The final analysis focuses exclusively on the effects of section 998 
on the distribution of court costs. The first row of each cell in Table 3 
gives the number of times a penalty occurred (that is, one party had 
to pay the court costs of both) compared to the total number of court 
cases. As can be seen, penalties were applied over 76% of the time. 
This implies that the majority of the subjects who went to court had 
rejected advantageous offers at some point during the negotiation 
process.  
 The second row of each cell in Table 3 breaks down the frequency 
of penalties between defendants (D) and plaintiffs (P). We only find a 
systematic difference in these frequencies in the Low Max condition, 
where plaintiffs were four times more likely to be penalized than de-
fendants. 
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TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 998 PENALTIES 
 SYM ASYM SYM ASYM 
  2  18 4   20 
 4 / 5 8 / 8 6 / 7 7 / 8 
High          
Fees D = 0, P = 4 D = 4, P = 4 D = 6, P = 0 D = 4, P = 3 
 6  22 8 24 
 18 / 20 12 / 19 14 / 17 13 / 20 
Low         
Fees D = 7, P = 11 D = 6, P = 6 D = 11, P = 3 D = 9, P = 4 
 10 26 12 28 
 7 / 11 11 / 12 3 / 5 15 / 26 
High         
Fees D = 1, P = 6 D = 0, P = 11 D = 2, P = 1 D = 4, P =11 
  14 30 16 32 
 16 / 16 25 / 27 6 / 12 24 / 34 
Low         
Fees D = 5, P=11 D = 3, P = 22 D = 1, P = 5 D = 5, P = 19 
 
Note: The ratio indicates the number of times a penalty was assigned to the to-
tal number of court cases. Forty-eight suits are in each block. Cell numbers cor-
respond to those in Table 1.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Our experimental results suggest that a two-way cost-shifting 
rule, such as section 998, California Code of Civil Procedure, does not 
change litigants’ tendency to settle before trial. However, section 998 
produces settlement outcomes more favorable to plaintiffs than does 
the baseline condition. This suggests that section 998 makes defen-
dants more cautious during negotiations than plaintiffs. This inter-
pretation is further substantiated by the fact that defendants were 
penalized less often for rejecting favorable offers, only 67 times, com-
pared to plaintiffs who were penalized 120 times. 
 Our subjects tend to behave rationally when confronted with 
changes in the magnitude of court costs. The overall settlement rate 
under low costs was 58.7% compared to 77.7% under high costs. High 
costs increased the number of settlements across all treatment vari-
ables. This suggests that high court costs create strong incentives for 
settlement. One possible application of this result is to increase court 
costs by including attorneys’ fees as recoverable costs in cost-shifting 
rules, such as Rule 68 and section 998. 
 The amount of information available to litigants has an indeter-
minate effect on settlement rates. Under specific conditions, symmet-
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ric information, as promoted by liberal discovery rules, increases set-
tlement rates. In particular, symmetric information causes the court 
to be used less often when Max is low and the range of potential court 
outcomes is small. This is offset by the fact that symmetric informa-
tion can actually impede settlement when the court’s decision range 
is large. Asymmetric information also has a mixed effect on settle-
ment rates. When parties under asymmetric information form very 
different expectations regarding the court decision, settlement rates 
are low, especially if the plaintiff’s expected court decision exceeds 
that of the defendant. This overoptimism can lead plaintiffs to reject 
reasonable settlement offers and frequently end up in court. On the 
other hand, when expectations are similar and the range of potential 
court awards is large, asymmetric information can promote settle-
ment by reducing perceptions of greed that can impede negotiations. 
 Finally, when we look at efficiency, as measured by whether court 
should have been avoided, we observe an interesting difference when 
we compare ex ante efficiency with ex post. Using an ex ante measure 
of efficiency, we observe that 20% of the cases that should have set-
tled actually ended up in court. While this efficiency is not affected by 
a switch between the baseline condition and section 998, efficiency 
measures do improve under higher court costs. This result is consis-
tent with the increase in settlement rates due to higher court costs. 
However, when we look at ex post efficiency, which takes into account 
the final offers received before going to court, we see a dramatic fall 
in efficiency, with 67% of the cases that should have settled ending 
up in court. Furthermore, this type of inefficiency is exacerbated by 
high court costs. Since ex ante efficiency is more likely than ex post to 
be measured in field studies, these results suggest that a more cau-
tious interpretation of field data is required. It may be that rules 
which encourage the taking of final offers could have a dramatic ef-
fect on overall efficiency in use of the courts. 
 
